Playing for control: Can Finland’s new gambling system shut out the black market?
- Antti Koivula
- Jun 9
- 5 min read

Introduction – Enforcement against the black market holds a key role
Finland’s new Gambling Act marks a major structural shift in the country’s regulatory framework, ending the current monopoly model and introducing a dual-market system. Under the new model, the monopoly will continue to apply to lottery games, pools, land-based casino games and land-based slots, while betting, online bingo, online casino games, and online slots will be opened to licensed competition.
Operators may apply for a license starting at the beginning of 2026, with licensed operations permitted to begin from January 1, 2027. The success of this reform hinges on achieving a delicate balance between regulatory restrictions and market freedoms—creating a framework attractive enough to draw the majority of operators into the legal market, while also enabling effective harm prevention. It is a complex regulatory puzzle in which all moving parts must function cohesively.
Just as critical as the structure of the legal framework is the enforcement mechanism supporting it. Without effective supervision of the unlicensed sector, the incentive to enter the licensed market diminishes rapidly. If black market operators can operate freely while licensed ones face stricter rules and costs, the system risks collapsing under its own weight.
This article sheds light on the enforcement powers established under the new Finnish Gambling Act. We begin by outlining the legal tools granted to the regulator, and then assess their practical effectiveness in curbing illegal activity.
The regulatory toolbox: What powers does the authority have?
According to the proposed Gambling Act and its explanatory note, the supervisory authority—the new Licensing and Supervisory Agency, set to begin operations in 2027—will have the following enforcement tools:
Prohibition orders on gambling and marketing activitiesThe authority may prohibit unlawful gambling operations or marketing, whether carried out by licensed operators or unauthorised entities.
Publication of sanctionsThe authority may publicly disclose imposed sanctions or decisions, acting as an additional deterrent against non-compliance.
Three types of finesDepending on the severity of the infringement, fines from a few hundred euros to several million euros may be imposed.
Revocation of licenseA last-resort measure applicable if an operator continues to breach obligations despite previous enforcement actions.
Takedown orders for online content and domainsA last-resort measure through which the authority may order the removal of illegal gambling-related content or domain names from registries.
Criminal proceedingsThe authority may forward cases for police investigation in criminal proceedings.
Effectiveness of the current enforcement
On April 4, 2025, the current regulator—the National Police Board (NPB), which will oversee the enforcement until the new agency takes over in 2027, and whose personnel will be transferred to the new authority—stated in its submission to Finnish Parliament's Economic Affairs Committee that “the proposed enforcement powers are relatively extensive and should enable effective implementation and supervision.” But is the enforcement situation really anticipated to be that sound?
In practice, the NPB already has a similar toolkit: prohibition orders, two forms of fines, and the ability to refer cases for criminal proceedings. Currently, there is also a PSP-blocking mechanism in place—but it only applies to deposits and is notoriously easy to circumvent, as Betsson Group demonstrated last year. It’s worth noting that the first draft of the new law included PSP- and ISP-blocking, but these measures were eventually removed from the proposed legislation.
How effective has enforcement been under the current law? Not very. The internet remains flooded with illegal gambling ads in Finnish, tailored specifically for Finnish audiences. The current monopoly leaks worse than a novice poker player's tell at a WSOP final table. The NPB has taken steps to intervene, but its efforts appear largely futile at present.
What are the new tools expected to make a difference?
The publication of sanctions is one new element. Yet, to some extent, this already occurs. The NPB maintains a PSP-blocking list—essentially a public "name and shame" list—available on its website. They often also issue press releases on enforcement actions, which are always picked up by Finnish media. So, this isn’t really a new tool after all. At best, the publication will have only limited impact on black market operators, who may see any publicity in Finland as beneficial rather than harmful.
License revocation is another addition, but it only applies to licensed operators. Takedown orders for illegal content and domains may be a powerful tool in theory, but in practice, their use will be constrained. High thresholds for use, coupled with administrative law requirements and jurisdictional issues with foreign service providers, will significantly hamper their effectiveness.
The criminal law dimension remains unchanged. Although criminal investigations have somewhat increased recently, their number remains low, and sanctions are modest. A significant shift in enforcement patterns is unlikely in the short term.
Indirect enforcement: B2B licensing and player taxation
Two additional measures aim to indirectly discourage engagement with the black market: B2B licensing and player taxation.
The B2B licensing requirement—which mandates that licensed B2C operators use only licensed B2B providers—comes into force in 2028. Licensed B2B providers must restrict their services to licensed B2C operators within Finland. However, early indicators suggest lax oversight, and that the B2B license may end up being little more than a bureaucratic rubber stamp, akin to the Swedish model. Hopefully, this will not be the case, but there are currently no signs to the contrary.
As for player taxation, the law does not prohibit Finns from using unlicensed gambling sites. However, doing so will carry harsh tax implications. Winnings will be fully taxable, while losses are not deductible. Worse yet, every single game round is treated as a separate taxable event. This means that a player could lose €5,000 but still generate €200,000 in taxable "winnings"—which, in Finland’s progressive tax system, means over €100,000 in taxes. Failure to report such "income" should result in charges of aggravated tax fraud, carrying penalties of up to four years in prison.
Yet how many players will know or care, and is there genuine intention to enforce these taxation rules? Ironically, it is the most vulnerable—problem gamblers—who are least likely to be informed or capable of compliance. These are precisely the individuals the new law is supposed to protect. And how much will be achieved by subjecting this group to lifelong debt and potential imprisonment?
Conclusion: Enforcement ambitions meet market realities
Despite optimistic claims from the current regulator, confidence in the upcoming system’s ability to meaningfully curb black market gambling remains low. While the new Act introduces some formal changes, many of the so-called 'new' enforcement tools are either already in place or face significant legal and practical obstacles.
Key measures such as takedown orders and license revocation are largely symbolic when it comes to unauthorised offshore operators, who remain outside the effective reach of Finnish jurisdiction. Similarly, B2B licensing and punitive player taxation may introduce friction but are unlikely to fundamentally change user or operator behaviour without clearer implementation plans and visible enforcement actions.
If the Finnish government expects the licensing system to succeed, it must acknowledge that enforcement against the black market will be more about execution under political, technical, and legal constraints. As it stands, the regime risks being perceived as a well-intentioned but underpowered response to a problem that has proven far more resilient than policymakers may have hoped.
Ultimately, without bold strategic prioritisation, proper resourcing, and political will, even the sharpest enforcement tools risk becoming symbolic. The new regulator will need more than legal powers—it will need coordination, flexibility, and unwavering focus to shift the balance from an unregulated market to a truly channelised, fair, and responsible gambling environment.
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